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The present study attempted to'gather information
about the background leading to the banking crises in
Hong Kong in the period 1982-86 and in the U.K. in
1973-75. It sought to examine the relationship between the
symptoms and the consequences of the crises. Attempts were
made to find out if there were alternatives open to the
local Government other than indiscriminately saving every
problem bank. Remedial actions taken by the banking super-
visors in both places were analysed. The ultimate objective
of the study was to find out what could be learned from the
banking crises in the two world-class financial centres so
that appropriate action can be taken to prevent the
recurrence of similar problems.
3TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii





II. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 3
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISES 6
IV. CAUSES OF THE CRISES 11
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RESCUE 22
VI. ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES? 29
VII. THE NEW BANKING LEGISLATION 33
VIII.IS THE PROBLEM SOLVED? 36







1. Growth Rates of Money Stock
(per cent per annum)........ 13
2. Growth Rates of Domestic Credit
(per cent per annum)............ 15
3. Sterling Borrowing:
17Interbank and on Certificate of Deposit...
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to express his heartiest thanks
to his wife Carol and his three children, Benjamin, Daniel and
Elizabeth, for their encouragement and support during the last
three years.
The author would also like to express his gratitude to
the lecturers of the Three-Year MBA pregramme of the Chinese
University of Hong Kong, and in particular to his supervisor,
Professor John Espy, for his invaluable advice.
The author would also like to thank his close friends,
especially those in the. banking field who inspired him to
study this research topic and also commented on the several




Government Rescues Another Bank, $300M
Credit Will Keep Hong Nin's Door Open------
The Commissioner of Banking, Mr. Robert Fell,
yesterday assumed control of the Hong Nin Bank,
marking the seventh time in three years that
the Hong Kong Government has intervened
directly in the banking sector.
This headline of the South China Morning Post on
September 9, 1986 adequately revealed how serious the bank-
ing situation in Hong Kong was during the period. The Hong
Kong Government, well-known as the last bastion of laissez
faire policy on earth, was forced to intervene seven times
in the banking sector. It was estimated that total cost of
the rescue amounted to a minimum of HK$3 billion or perhaps
as high as HK$4 billion.1
Apart from the cost of public money, the action
taken by the Government has met with many queries, both
from the mass media and in public gatherings. Even Legislative
Councillors, whose support in the Council enabled quick
action by the Government to take over some of the banks,
were openly querying the wisdom of such actions. Public
commentary, both within the legislature and throughout the
business community, has revealed grave reservations about
the Government's sweeping powers to support banks in.
trouble. often because of corrupt or criminal activities by their
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managements or by commercial blunder.
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In many respects, the indiscriminate action of the
Hong Kong Government to bailout all the local banks which
were on the verge. of liquidation was similar to the famous
'lifeboat' operation taken by the Bank of England in con-
junction with British clearing banks to save a large number
of secondary banks in the period 1973-75.
Obviously there were many differences between the
two; for example the lifeboat operation was taken to save
secondary banks whereas in Hong Kong, the Government was
saving commercial banks whose. status and services offered
resemble those of the U.K. clearing banks. The UK secondary
banks include many conglomerates with diversified interests
but the local commercial banks were restricted by law from
engaging in large scale non-bank businesses. The UK rescue
was undertaken jointly by the Central Bank and the commercial
banks, with the cost shared, but the local operation was
mainly done by the Government using public money, though in
a few cases private enterprises were involved on commercial
terms. However history repeated itself, albeit in another
part of the world. With hind-sight, we could therefore say
that what caused the secondary banking crises in the UK





The importance of the recent banking crisis on the
future political and economic stability of Hong.Kong should
not be under-stated. Hong Kong cannot afford another
crisis of confidence during the run-up to 1997. A crisis of
confidence may involve the local currency, the banking system
or the smooth functioning of the economy.
The main objective of this research paper is to identify
the causes and symptoms of the crisis, Bearing in mind the famous
Marxist saying that history repeats itself, it is hoped that
some measure could be found to prevent the recurrence of the
same in the future. The other objective of this paper is to
try to answer the numerous questions raised as to whether
there were alternatives other than to 'nationalise' several
of the problem banks and to spend so-much of the public
money to save others.
As a British colony (though now officially called
a 'territory'), Hong Kong owes much of its development to
the British system. The making of the local Banking Ordin-
ance, in particular, depended a lot on the British exper--
ience. An investigation into British banking history may
help develop our wisdom in understanding the local problem.
The famous UK secondary banking crisis and the solution to
the problem were therefore studied intensively with a view
of identifying similarities between the two. Symptoms of
banking problems which occured in both cases may be very
good indicators for future reference. An understanding of
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the logic behind the 'lifeboat' operation may shed light on
the reason behind actions taken by the local authorities.
Information on which the paper was based was in the
main obtained from an extensive literature review. Library
research was conducted at both The Chinese University of
Hong Kong and the University of Hong Kong. As a result of
this effort, valuable materials were obtained from journals,
magazines and books. On the UK secondary banking crisis, the
book The Secondary Banking Crisis, 1973-75 written by
Margaret Reid when she was a research fellow at Nuffield
College, Oxford, was particularly valuable. Because of her
involvement in reporting the incident when it first broke
out, she was able to provide the most thorough anatomy of
the crisis. Opinions of very senior officials of organisa-
tions which participated in the lifeboat operation could
also be found. When one tries to find information on
British banking topics, one will never omit such authorita-
tive publications like Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin
and The Banking World (formerly known as the Journal of
the Institute of Bankers). The former is probably the only
source where one can get to know on a regular basis official
opinions of the British banking supervisors and the latter
is the source of opinions of professional bankers.
On the Hong Kong front, partly because of the recent
nature of the incident and partly because of the possible
lack of interest in the issue, there have not been many
relevant publications. There has not yet been a single book
published on the issue but valuable information can be
obtained frpm journals and magazines like the Asiar anking,
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Hong Kong Business, Far Eastern Economic Review etc..
Newspaper, especially the South China Morning Post, were
also important sources of information. Because of his
personal interest in this area, the writer of this paper
has collected newspaper clippings since 1981 and these also
became an important source of secondary information.
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CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISES
A. The Hong Kong Scene
Though the first Government action to nationalise
a bank happened in September, 1983, the banking crisis
surfaced long before that date.(In early September 1982,
the Tse Lee Yuen chain of jewellery shops suddenly closed
their doors without mentioning how they were going to honour
the large number of outstanding gold certificates issued
by them. This triggered off a run on the Hang Lung Bank,
which was rumoured to have lent heavily to the jewellery
chain. The run was later suppressed after the Standard
Chartered Bank (then the Chartered Bank) came to help.
Towards the end of the year, following the disclosure of
financial difficulties of two property giants, Eda Invest-
ment and Carrian Investment Limited, several small-size
deposit-taking companies (DTCs) found themselves in trouble,
and their registrations were suspended by the Government.
These included Dollar Credit and Financing Ltd., America
and Panama Finance Co., Axona International Credit and
Commerce Ltd., Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd., Hong Kong Deposit
and Guaranty Co. Ltd., and Whitehall Finance Ltd..3 Of
these, the Dollar Credit case was the most important in
relation to subsequent developments. It closed its doors
in November.1982 and was found to be short of HK$650 million.
Colin Martin, the Banking Commissioner, said that
it was partly because of Dollar Credit that relationships
between Hang Lung and other banks turned sour so that Hang
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Lung was ostracized. The complicated relationships between
Hang Lung Bank, Dollar Credit -and several other quoted
public companies which were in trouble caused suspicion
in the banking community and eventually hastened Hang Lung's
demise via the cutting off of most inter-bank credit lines.4
This led to the emergency legislation by the Government on-
September 27, 1983 to take over control of Hang Lung in
view of its possible non-payment of HK$148 million in cheques. 5,)
This was followed by a near crisis which involved the
Sun Hung Kai Bank. The bank used 70% of its net assets to
purchase its headquarters from a quoted company controlled
by its chairman. Before the crisis surfaced, two foreign
financial institutions announced the joint acquisition of the
controlling shares of the bank. The Government acted this time
behind the scene by announcing the addition of the bank to
its list of qualified depositories for the official Exchange
Fund. 6,
The next real crisis which occured six months later
was a more dramatic crash% On June 6,1985 directors of the
Overseas Trust Bank declared the bank to be insolvent and
unable to continue operating. Sir John Bremridge, the
Financial Secretary, ordered the closure of all branches
of the bank until further notice.7 The Legislative Council
then passed an emergency bill to enable the Government to
take control of the bank. By virtue of this, the Government
was in effect also taking control of another banks the
Hong Kong Industrial and Commercial Bank, which was 60%
owned by OTB. It was later found out that HICB was also in
trouble as, after provision for bad and doubtful debts, the
bank's net assets became a negative figure-8
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Not too long after this, another rescue action was
taken by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
and the Bank of China jointly by extending a substantial
standby secured credit facility to the Ka Wah Bank on
June 7, 1985.9 In subsequent developments the bank was
acquired by the China International Trust and Investment
Corporation (CITIC) by a cash injection of HK$350 million
in exchange for 92% of its ownership. The Government was
reported to be acting behind the scene by undertaking to
indemnify CITIC against bad debts outstanding in three
years' time.10 Later in the year in December, Hang Seng Bank
provided HK$176 million in return for 50.3% control of
Wing On Bank. Auditors Peat Marwick, Mitchell discovered
that almost HK$275 million of bad and doubtful debts could
be tied to a previous director. Again the Government pledged
a guarantee of its.interbank debts. 11
,The fifth rescue action by the Government involved
the small Union Bank. On March 27, 1986, the Banking Commis-
sioner directed merchant bankers Jardine Fleming to
take over the management of the ailing Union Bank on his
behalf. Union Bank was running into problems on a signifi-
cant portion of its loan book when its chairman left for
medical treatment in the USA and stayed there since September
1985.12 The Government again supported the bank with an
undisclosed credit line. The Government's control was
phased out later when the bank was acquired by a Sino-US
joint venture firm including the China-backed China Merchants
Steam Navigation Company at the end of June 1986.
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Despite the Government's repeated assurance that
there would be no more bank failures, the Commissioner of
Banking assumed control on September 8, 1986 of the Hong
Nin Bank, marking the seventh time in three years that the
Government has intervened in the banking sector. The announ-
cement came as a surprise as First Pacific Holdings, a
finance group in Hong Kong, had already announced its
intention to buy Hong Nin. It was believed that the difficulties
of Hong Nin surfaced during the course of First Pacific's
examination of the bank. 13
At the time of writing this paper, it appeared that
the rescue action had come to an end. From the start of the
DTC crisis in 1982 until the Hong Nin rescue in 1986, the
most serious banking crisis in the history of Hong Kong
lasted for five calendar years.
B. The U.K. Scene
The U.K. secondary banking crisis came quite suddenly.
In November 1973, the London and County Securities (L C)
found itself in liquidity difficulties, being unable to
renew deposits taken through the money markets. The Bank
of England decided to save L C, and thereby to protect its
depositors. When the affairs of L C were investigated, it
was found that 80% of its deposits were repayable within
three months, whilst its assets were highly illiquid
property investments and loans to associated companies
which had used to money to purchase property from L C.
The collapse of L C led to a widespread financial
crisis affecting all those financial institutions which had
financed property development from short-term borrowing.
The large wholesale lenders descended on the entire secon-
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dary banking sector and called back everything they could.
On December 20, 1973 the Bank of England recognized that
a general crisis was developing. At a late night meeting
between senior Bank of England officials and directors of-
Cedar Holdings, the second secondary bank soon to reveal
its problems, the Bank felt that the crisis would be trans-
mitted, through a domino effect, to the many.other secondary
banks which were also using short-term borrowing to finance
their assets tied up in the increasingly troubled property
sector. Thus, on December 21, 1973, the Bank of England
announced that it was forming a committee with the clearing
banks to provide support to any bank which the committee
considered worthy of rescue.
As it turn out, at least 25 secondary banks received
help, of which eight went into liquidation, one was scaled
down and sold off, and 14 of the remaining 16 were later
taken over. 14 At its peak in March 1975, the amount of
support put up by the committee reached £1,285.4 million.15
Of the money at risk in the operation, the Bank of England
took a stake of 10 per cent. The clearing banks' 90 per cent
share was divided up in the ratio of their eligible
liabilities.16 The banks, as clearers for the banks in
trouble, also took over some of them in the process of
rescue. Margaret Reid said that the incident "marked a new
departure in introducing the principle of joint action by
the central bank and leading commercial banks to deal with,
not only one, but a number of threatened banking disasters. "17
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CHAPTER IV
CAUSES OF THE CRISES
1. Vulnerability-of the Fractional Reserve Banking System
Mr. David. Nandick, Hong Kong's Secretary for Monetary
Affairs, has said that there could never be a system.-where
banks would never get into difficulty. 18 This. is very true
since the banking system is based on depositors' confidence.
Despite this fact,*there had seldom been serious problems
with the banking system of developed countries for more than
three decades since the Great Depression. This was because
in those days banks were practicing asset management in
their operation. Today the risk of bank failures is becoming
higher as most banks indulge in liability management. This
is a practice whereby banks keep on capturing lending oppor-
tunities and then buy in assets to balance their books. The
major source of funds is the secondary money market, mainly
the inter-bank market, which is very short-term in nature.
This therefore aggravates the mismatching problem. It is
therefore said that while banks are lending for longer terms
(e.g. property development), they are borrowing shorter than
before when they have to borrow from the interbank market.
Due to whatever reason, once this source of funds is stopped.
the borrowing bank will be in grave trouble. As mentioned
in page 9, the immediate cause leading to the trouble of
L C which triggered off the secondary banking crisis in
the U.K. was also due to the stoppage of interbank credit
lines. A general feature of virtually all the secondary
banks during the crisis was that short-term funds from the
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interbank market were relied on to finance venturesome
share investments and loans, even to the extent that the
interbank funding became a far more important source of
finance than personal deposits. This therefore made the
risks more acute when the cash was committed to assets of
vulnerable value. The fractional reserve banking system is
becoming more vulnerable today when banks are tempted to
mismatch their books.
2. Increased Money Supply and the Property Boom
The Government's monetary policy also gave rise
to the banking crises under study. In Hong Kong, the period
1977-82 was one of "overheating" with excessive growth in
monetary aggregates and credit. Table 1 compares the growth
of money stock in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the USA during the
period. It can be seen that while Hong Kong's real growth
rate during the period was only slightly higher than that
of Taiwan and the USA, its growth rate of M2 and M3 were
significantly higher than the other countries. A very
unhealthy situation of Hong Kong has been that its economic
growth could always cause more than proportionate growth
of credit to the property sector. From end-1978 to end-1982,
these loans by licensed banks grew more than fourfold from
HK$10.2 billion to HK$47.6 billion, while their proportion
in the total loan portfolio rose from 22 per cent to 34
per cent. 19
The property boom in the same period also prompted
some banks to abandon common sense in their lending policies.
Many banks over-committed themselves to a business which was
justified. As is well known, real estate loans are among the
most lucrative earning assets of a bank, but they are also
Table 1












Source: For Hong Kong, Hong Kong Monthly Digcstof Stntistics. For U.S.A., Federal Reserve
Bulletin. For Taiwan, Financial Statistics Monthly, The Central Bank of China.
Definitions Hong Kong Money supply
Ml Total legal tender notes and coins with the public, plus customers' demand
deposits with licensed banks.
42= Total Ml plus customers' savings and time deposits with licensed banks, plus
negotiable certificates of dcnosit issued by licensed banks and held outside
the montary sector.
M3= Total M2 plus customers' deposits with licensed and registered deposit-taking
companies, plus negotiable certificates of deposit issued by deposit-taking
companies held outside the monetary sector.
U.S. Money supply
= 41 The sumof (1) currency with the pull1c 141 issuers (3) demanddeposits at all commercial banks other than those due to
domestic banks, the U.S. Government, and foreign banks and official institutions
less cash items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float and
(4) other checkable accounts at banks and thrift institutions.
M2= M1 plus money market deposit accounts, savings and small-denomination time
deposits at all depository institutions, overnight repurchase agreements at
commercial banks, overnight Eurodollars held by U.S. residents other than
banks at Caribbean branches of member banks and balances of money market
mutual funds.
M3= M2 plus large-denomination time depository instutions, term
RPs at commercial banks and savings and loan associations, and balances of
institution-only money market mutual funds.
Taiwan Monev Supply
MIA= ThP sum of net currency, checking accounts, and other sight deosits.
Ml l= The sum of MIA and savings deposits.
M2- The sum of ml o and quasi-money (time dcpositis-term savings deposits.
postal savings deposits etc.).
Qu oted from Recent Banking Crises in Hong Kong and Taiwan:
A Comparative Perspective Y.C.Jao
issuers; (3) demand depoits at all commercial bankns other than thise due to
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the most illiquid and risky. Small banks with limited
capital may reach a state of over-reliance on this sector
without being aware of it. David Nandick said: "We have
analysed the sort of problems that have led to the
difficulties over the past few years. Those difficulties
are similar to what had happened elsewhere, namely the
concentration of lending to one or more connected borrowers."20
It has been felt by some in the past that the typical local
bank was too small to have been a keen major lender to
property developers or a partner in large property syndica-
tions. The real situation, as can be seen now, was that the
banks' customers might be heavily involved in property,
even when, on paper, they were merely manufacturers or
merchants. This was exactly what contributed to a large
part of the bad debt incurred by the Wing On Bank.21
Nevertheless, property has come to dominate the
local financial sector in the past, and the situation is not likely
to change. From official statistics, about a third of all
bank and DTC lending in Hong Kong goes to property
development, building and construction, or to property purchases.
It was reported that in the thirty months ending June 1982,
just under HK$24 billion was raised through syndicated
22
loans 11 of which 80 per cent was for property.
It was therefore inevitable that the collapse of the local
property market in 1983 had a strong bearing on the.prof st-
ability of every financial institution operating here,




Growth Rates of Domestic Credit












Note: N.A.= not available OFIs in Taiwan mean other financial institutions, including
medium business banks, credit cooperatives, credit departments of farmers' and fishermen's
associations, investment and trust companies, postal savings system, and life insurance
companies
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics and Taiwan Statistical Data Book.
Quoted from Recent Banking Crises in Hong Kong and Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective'
Y.C.Jao
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This kind of effect has long been noticed. The
consequence of the 1983 property slump had however not
been perfectly perceived. Mr.Frederic Dubois, General
Manager of Paribas Asia was quoted to have said: "Banks
have to be adult. These banks are here to share in extra-
ordinary profits generated by the Hong Kong economy when
things go well, so they shouldn't be scared when there's
a downturn."23 Mr. Peter Dodd of Barclays-Asia also said
that you can't enjoy the fruit of laissez-faire and then
complain that the Government doesn't intervene when things.
go wrong.24 The bankers thought that the property slump
was just part of the regular economic adjustment and did
not envisage that the Government had to intervene., not
only once. but many times later.
In the U.K.,the crash was also linked with the
money and property boom. The Government chose to continue
its pursuit of high economic growth and low interest rate
policy. Also owing to the rapid growth of the wholesale
money markets, the money supply as measured by M3 was
growing twice as fast as M1.25 Table 3 demonstrates that
from October 1971 to mid-1973 borrowing on the developing
sterling interbank wholesale markets virtually trebled
(from £3,867 million to £11,222 million).
The dramatic growth of the money stock was not used
to finance industrial growth. As in other depressed econ-
omies, the demand for money from the manufacturing industry
remained low throughout 1972 and early 1973. Property
development thus absorbed a major share of the rising
money supply. In the period 1971-73, bank lending to the
property sector roughly quadrupled. Moreover, this growth
17
Sterling Borrowing Inter-bank and on Certificate of Deposit











Source: Midland Bank Review, Aug 1973.
occurred despite a Bank of England caution, issued as
early as August 1972,-against overlending to the property
sector.26 Banks at this time took risks in lending a very
high proportion --75 or 30 per cent-- of the value of
the land or buildings charged to them as security if the
lender was taking an equity stake in the project, as
secondary banks often did, up to 90 or 100 per cent of the
value was often advanced. A writer even reported that some
banks even lent in excess of 100 per cent to allow for
professional fees and advice. 27
Under this atmosphere, the growth of the money stock
caused serious alarm amongst overseas holders of sterling
and a run on the sterling pound developed. On July 27,1973
the Bank of England was forced to increase its Minimum
Lending Rate (MLR) by four per cent from 7 to 11 per
cent, thus drastically altering the economics of borrowtn
As the secondary banks had traded on the simple basis that
they could always roll over their loans from the wholesale
market, long-term loans they had made earlier in the year
then began to look like bad deals. In November 1973, with
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the outbreak of the oil crisis, a further increase of the
MLR to 13 per cent and the Chancellor's announcement of
his intention to introduce a development gain tax, the
London Stock Market collapsed and the banking crisis became
imminent. 28
3. Mismanagement and Fraudulent Practices
In Hong Kong, there were incidences of owners and
managers of small local banks using depositors' money to
fund their own speculation, protected from discovery by
the undemanding nature of local bank supervision.29 The
Banking Commissioner admitted that fraud by top management
was most difficult to detect and eliminate and would
continue to be SO. 30 Appendix I shows several court cases
which had surfaced. Perhaps there would be more to come.
There were other cases of mismanagement whereby
family-run banks usually found it difficult to reject credit
requests by close borrowers who had always regarded loans as
almost theirs by right.31 Appendix II shows that in some
cases, sums higher than shareholders' funds were lent to
insiders. This also leads us to suspect that there might
have been other cases unrevealed by court action which
involved lendi g to nominee companies which were by law
ahle to hide the identity of the real owners.
In the U.K. there were also several court cases
as an aftermath of the secondary banking crisis. The first
one was linked with Sterling Industrial Securities. A
shareholder and director of the company, Mr. Finley, was
convicted of corruption concerning loans to a Mr. Wheatley,
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representative of the Crown Agents on the board of the
company. Mr. Wheatley died in 1977 before charges
brought against him were heard. Mr. Davidson, Managing
Director, was also sued by the Crown Agents saying that a
sum belonging to the Crown Agents was given to him as an
unsecured loan due to the improper and unauthorised
actions of Mr. Wheatley.32
The second court case involved another secondary
bank with Israeli connection. Mr. Harry Landy, who ran
the Israel-British Bank, was jailed in Britain after being
found guilty of conspiracy to defraud and of conspiracy to
utter forged documents. However, in January 1981, the Court
of Appeal quashed his convictions.33
The third one concerned L & C, the company which
triggered off the crisis. The inspectors report published
in 1976 concluded that Mr. Caplan and one other executive
director had operated fraudulently in a number of tran-
sactions; and that the bank balances shown in the accounts
of L & C and its principle subsidiary for the financial
year ending March 31,1973 had been deliberately inflated
with the intention of deceiving depositors and others as
to the businesses' liquidity. As a result, Mr. Caplan and
nine others faced theft and other charges in court involving
some £10 million.34
The fifth case was brought against Mr. John
Stonehouse, who ran the London Capital Group, as a result
of which he had to serve jail sentences.35
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There were other legal follow-ups. Inspectors were
reported to be investigating the affairs of Grendon Trust
and the involvement of the Crown Agents in the business of
the secondary banks. Proceedings were brought by the Trade
Department against Mr. Jim Slater of Slater Walker Securities
under Section 54 of the Companies Act, which prohibits
companies from financing purchases of their own shares.
Mr.Slater was afterwards convicted on fifteen charges and
fined £15 on each. 36
These are the three main reasons common to the
banking crises in both places. There is, however, another
cause which contributed-to the local problem.
4. Weak Ownership
Banking Commissioner Robert Fell has said that a
noticeable weakness which had been identified during the
crisis was the weak ownership of some local banks. Some of
them might have suffered losses but still had a reasonable
net worth. Had fresh capital been injected before rumours
spread too far, these banks would not be in crisis. Their
owners were however reluctant or unable to restore the
capital to a proper level. 37 These banks were also charac-
terised by their manifold and complex links with overseas
Chinese businesses and businessmen throughout Southeast
Asia, especially with Malaysia and Singapore.
Appendix III shows the overseas connections of the
banks in crisis. Examples since the collapse of property
companies like Carrian and Eda and before the banking
crisis under study may lead us to infer that the way some
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groups of Chinese businessmen conduct their businesses
should lead a prudent law enforcer to pay special attention
to their business practices.
22
CHAPTER V
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RESCUE
When the rescue action was launched to "nationalise"
Hang Lung Bank, the general feeling throughout the Hong Kong
business community was favourable. But when the Government
took action to save the rest of the ailing banks, public
reaction was mixed. Civil servants, bankers and some
Legco members said the actions were inevitable. Others,
especially the academics, were doubtful of the justification
for the last several rescues.
The reasons stated by Sir John Bremridge in a
press conference on September 27, 1983 after the rescue
of Hang Lung Bank could also be the reasons for subsequent
rescues.38 The first reason behind the Hang Lung Bank
(Acquisition) Ordinance was to safequard the depositors'
interest. It was reported that OTB alone had as many as
100,000 depositors and this group of people, who are mostly
small savers, may cause a lot of public discontent under
a political atmosphere which was already not very stable.
In fact, the political tension in the run-up to 1997 makes
the Government reluctant to allow even small ripples in
the banking sector for fear that they may grow into a
major crisis of confidence.
The second reason given was to protect employment
of the staff. This one is subject to arguments. When this was
done on a very small scale like that of rescuing Hang Lung
Bank, there might not be much opposition. Obviously there
was no reason for this to be carried out indiscriminately
to all banks but not to other industries. Therefore this
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reason has not been cited by any Government official after
the Hang Lung case.
The third reason was to maintain world confidence
in Hong Kong as the world's third financial center. Sir
John Bremridge stressed after the Hang Lung takeover that
the Government remains committed to its policy of safe-
guarding the exchange rate of Hong Kong dollar and the
stability and reputation of the banking system.39 This is
perhaps the most important reason behind the series of
Government actions. As Margaret Reid put it in defense of
the lifeboat operation in the U.K.:
the gains are not precisely quantifiable since
they consist largely in the avoidance of dangers to
the whole banking system which, because the worst
did not happen, can never be the subject of more
than judgement and estimate.What is clear is that
confidence in British (Hong Kong) banking was
preserved and the rot was stopped from spreading
.......Depositors were fully protected.(40)
The Deputy Governor of the Bank of England pointed
out in 1983 that in certain circumstances, the collapse of
a bank could, in the absence of any official action, lead
to a loss of confidence in the system as a whole and a
massive withdrawal of funds. 41 He said:
Individuals'may be unable to judge quickly
whether the failure of the individual bank is due
solely to its own shortcomings or whether the
factors that brought it down are more general.-\At
the same time, these individuals may withdraw
their deposits not just from one bank but from the
whole banking industry and turn them into cash
with great speed and at little cost. In this
context, formal disclosure requirements are
unlikely to be of much practical assistance.
Irrespective of the strength of a bbe rendered
sheet on objective grounds, it may still rendered
insolvent by the actions of other depositors.
a result,banks which are perfectly solvent and hold
sizeable liquid reserves can suffer a liquidity
shortage which might cause them to fail.
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With the limited information available, this could also be
one of the reasons why the Government took control of the
Union Bank, whose net asset value was said to be on the
positive side.
Another gain from the whole strategy was that, again
like that of the lifeboat, problems were solved in such a way
that no borrowing bank defaulted on its obligation on the
international scene. This would have had damaging repercus-
sions on confidence in Hong Kong and indeed generally in
international financial markets. However, how likely the
international chain reaction would happen was difficult to
ascertain because the Government has never revealed what
portion of the banks' deposits were from internaticnal
institutions. One may worry that, if such a sizeable bank
like OTB was allowed to subside, foreign banks would with-
draw from the local money market and Hong Kong's credit
risk as a financial centre would inevitably be reassessed.
In this respect, the philosophy of the Hong Kong Govern-
ment might have been influenced by the lifeboat operation
of the U.K.. The rescue of the OTB, which may cost the
Exchange Fund HK$2 billion, may also be a reflection of the
principle of "parental responsibility"42 propounded by the
Governor of the Bank of England. The principle put forward
by Mr. Richardson was that parent banks should accept respon-
sibility for the well-being of their offshoots the world
over and that supervisory authorities should interest
themselves in this being done. The OTB was the third largest
local bank at the time of its collapse and it had eight
branches overseas. These include one in Macau with deposits
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of HK$150 million and another in Canada with assets reported
to total US$36.7 million.43 There were also branches in
London, Bahrain and San Francisco. Had the Government
allowed OTB to collapse, it might have created crises at
places like Columbo and Macau. With the adoption of the
principle of parental responsibility like that of a central
bank, the Hong Kong Government was in effect helping these
small countries avoid possible crises.
It has been said that the Government might
have developed the habit of rescuing ailing banks. However,
the writer's opinion was that the Government's behaviour
was a demonstration of moral responsibility. The Financial
Secretary had repeatedly declared to the public the Government's
determination to maintain the stability of the banking sector
and, every time after a rescue, senior Government officials
said no other banks were in trouble. Therefore the Govern-
nent had acquired a moral responsibility towards those
depositors who had not withdrawn their money from local banks
because of their awareness of the official. declarations.
It was because of all these important but unquanti-
fiable factors that the rescue action performed by the Hong
Kong Government won the praise of the Chinese Government.
The State-owned New China News Agency supported the move and
said it was correct to use the Exchange Fund to save the
problem-ridden banks.44
However, there were still a lot of objections to
the generous action of the Government. The following points
have been raised:
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First the cost of the rescue was tremendous.
Estimates have varied from a low of HK$3 billion to a high
of HK$4 billion. 45
Secondly it was-felt that the Government rescue was
fundamentally alien to important principles which have made
Hong Kong successful. 46 The opinion was that any social or
economic consequences arising from the collapse of a not
insignificant bank were part of the short-term price to be
paid to maintain that success in the long-run. This point
cannot stand if we accept the assumption that any bank
failures in Hong Kong will affect its reputation as a
financial centre. No one can prove whether this assumption
is valid or not. The most we can say is that the Government
is too conservative or is extremely prudent so that it dare
not take the risk, no matter how small the chance is.
A third criticism of the Government's philosophy is
based ors equity grounds. A vice-chairman of the Chinese
Manufacturers' Association said the Government repeatedly
rejected the establishment of an industrial bank to assist
the industrial sector but spent billions of tax-payers'
money to save banks. He questioned the fairness of banks
paying dividends to shareholders in good times and public
money being used to bail them out in bad times. He therefore
suggested that the Government should allow any bank to close
its doors, as the Singaporean Government allowed Pan
Electric Industries to collapse.47
The fourth criticism concerned the lack of information
from the Government to support its actions. This was raised
by an outspoken Legdo member, Mr. Szeto Wah, who said:
"I am very concerned about whether there might. be more
banks running into financial trouble, and whether the
Government would. continue to come to their rescue.....
I think the Government should clearly state under what
conditions will it rescue an ailing bank.48 Every time the
Government was forced to save another bank, the financial
secretary said, that it was the last time and all other
banks were in a good state of health. Even Legco members, who
passed bills to enable the Government actions, were not happy
with the meagre information they could obtain. Mr. Martin
Lee, another Legco member, also queried the way the Govern-
ment saved one bank of ter another. He did not want to see
the Exchange Fund resorted to every time there was a
troubled bank. Mr Lee further argued that regardless of the
fundamental merits of banking rescues, they should be
carried out only with public accountability of the money
involved, not behind the veil of Exchange Fund secrecy.
Secrecy begets suspicion, said Mr. Lee on March 26, 1986,
attacking the Ka Wah bail-out.49
With the meagre information the Government leaks
out, there appeared grounds for another argument. Some of
the banks rescued were not that critical. For example, it
was said that the Union Bank had sufficient assets to allow it
to seek help from commercial banks.50 On the other hand
the OTB case would not be a bad bankruptcy as it had the
assets to pay, f: creditors at the rate of 70 cents on the dollar. 51
A final point against the indiscriminate bank
rescue was very embarassing to the Government.. Mr. Richard
Farrant, an advisor from the Bank of England to the
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local Commissioner of Banking, said that an efficient
banking system required periodic invigoration by new
entrants to it, and periodic cleansing by the removal of
failures. Stressing that these were his personal views,
Mr. Farrant further pointed out that the Government could
not cope with many more rescues. 52 His theory sounds all
right at least it was in line with the spirit of capital-
ism. However the banking industry is not like the grocery
business where the principle of survival of the fittest is
accepted by everybody. The banking industry involves thou-
sands of depositors whose savings in the bank are certainly
not the same as money lent to a businessman for a high
return and at a high risk. If Farrant's theory stands, the
lifeboat was the largest mistake committed by England 's
central bank in human history.
There will never be an answer to the question as to
whether it was correct to rescue banks, whether in Hong
Kong or in the U.K. However, a knowledge of all these





If one feels that the Government should not take
a laissez faire attitude, the next question to be asked is,
"are there other alternatives?" The answer is again affirmative
but not in the normative sense.
The first alternative is, while personal depositors
with troubled banks should be safeguarded, companies and
other institutions which had lent to these banks should have
known better and ought to be left to bear the consequences.
Social unrest will then-be avoided as those who could not
afford to lose were protected. However this may not be
appropriate for the interest of Hong Kong as a reputable
world financial centre. Though the major banks would remain
as trustworthy as they have been, this move would in effect
drive all local banks,especially those smaller ones, out
of business. Not only will institutional lenders stop lending
to these small banks, small depositors would also leave
them so as not to risk a future Government's change of mind.
Furthermore, it is doubted whether institutional lenders
did have more information about the bank's borrowers. Under
the existing legislation, the volume of information banks
are required to disclose is far from being enough to
formulate a sound opinion.
Secondly, it was suggested that it was not neces-
sarily in the interest of confidence to rescue all affected
banks. This approach envisaged that if some of the least
respected names were allowed to collapse in a flurry of
30publicity with losses to their depositors, it would have
acted like a quick piece of surgery on the banking system,
cutting out the canker and enabling the rest to continue.
Richard Farrant has already suggested the possibility of
making a hard decision to cancel the authorisation of a
bank at an early stage to achieve a more orderly run down
of the business. 53 He suggested that the practical action
required to accompany the cancellation of the bank license
would amount to a receivership on behalf of ordinary
creditors. The bank would be required to cease to make new
loans or investments and to liquidate or sell existing ones
for cash. However the fact was that the major collapses
were all at the early stage of the crisis. The risk of
allowing the first few banks to collapse would be far
greater than a prudent government would shoulder,
The third method by which the scale of the rescue
could be Minimised is to raise the conditions for help once
general confidence in the banking system had been strengthened.
Dr. Ho Yan-ki of the Chinese University of Hong Kong warned that
if the Government was seen to be assuming heavier respon-
sibility to back up mismanaged banks, others which find
themselves protected from failure may be encouraged to take
higher risks for greater returns. 54 When applied in Hong
Kong, the consequence of this course of action would be
that some banks may not be able to survive without uncon-
ditional help from the Government. As the causes of almost
all the crises were largely the same since the Hang Lung
takeover, this alternative may also lead to the question
of fairness. Those savers who suffered losses when some
banks failed to receive help at the latter stage of the
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crisis may ask why public money was used to save some, but
not all.
The last alternative to be applied in Hong Kong
might have been the U.K. lifeboat model. The operation may
be jointly performed by the Government with the participation
of commercial banks. Obviously this could only involve
local banks. Under such a situation when even the third
largest local bank failed, one may ask how many of the
remaining banks are qualified to oin in the plan. Apart
from the Hong Kong Bank Group which had already participated
through its subsidiary Hang Seng Bank in the Wing On rescue,
the only likely candidate is the Bark of East Asia. Even in the
Wing On Case, Hang Seng was joining under the Government
guarantee of Wing On's bad debt. The UK formula of requiring
the commercial banks to be responsible for a share of the
cost of rescue is beyond imagination in Hong Kong. This
course of action may turn out to be a shock to the local
community instead of building up confidence.
Had there been a central bank in Hong Kong or a
mechanism providing deposit insurance, the choice of the
Government might have been different. Under the given
environment, if something had to be done, it would have to
be done by the Government. When the Government had to do
it,it would have to take into consideration the political
stability of Hong Kong, the benefits of the whole economy
and the fairness to all parties concerned. It therefore
seemed logical for the Government to choose the most trouble-
free method of saving all banks indiscriminately. The
decision might have been influenced by the success of the
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lifeboat operation in the U.K. but irrespective of this,
this seemed to be the only choice available at the
moment.
Once this policy is adopted, there will never be a
day in the future when the Government is free from the
possibility of having to bail out problem banks. The
closer 1997 draws, the greater the political tension, the
lower the chance the Government is willing to see a crisis of
any kind. The Government's immediate job is to ensure there
will be no more problem banks.
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CHAPTER VII
THE NEW BANKING LEGISLATION
As a result of the public concern over the loopholes
in the existing banking laws, Government officials all
commented during the crisis that a new bill would be drafted
to tighten up the control of banks. The draft law was
gazetted on March 6, 1986 and was passed by the Legislative
Council on June 4 of the same year. The principal features
of the new law are:
1. The Banking Commissioner has the power to appoint
a second bank auditor. Procedures were also fixed
to allow either the bank examiner or outside
auditors to call a tripatite meeting with the
bank management represented.
2. An institution shall not, except with the Commis-
sioner's approval, lend against the security of
its own shares, shares of its parent companies,
subsidiaries, or other companies in the same
group.
3. Any one acquiring 10 per cent or more of the
shares of a Hong Kong bank must obtain the Commis-
sioner's approval before they can vote the shares.
4. All appointments of directors and company secre-
taries of local banks would be subject to the
Commissioner's prior approval.
5. The Commissioner would have blanket power to
order a bank not to engage in any business
practices which will or may cause the soundness
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of the lending institution to be dependent on a
single party.
6. Calculation of the 25 per cent liquidity ratio
was changed from an annual to a monthly basis.
It was stipulated that at least 25 per cent of
any liabilities maturing within one month must
be covered by liquifiable assets maturing within
the same period. Definition of liquifiable
assets and liabilities were given.
7. The capital adequacy ratio of local banks was
fixed at 5 per cent for banks. A grace period of
two years was granted before this clause is to
be enforced.
Furthermore, it' was also approved that the manpower
of the Banking Commissioner's office would increase by
40 to a staff of 200 to enable the Commission to carry out
more thorough checks on banks.
In summary, the new Ordinance gave very wide powers
to the Banking Commissioner. The legislation was more
flexible than before as it relied more on the Banking
Commissioner's discretion and qualitative judgement.
With regard to the prevention of over-exposing a
bank to the creditworthiness of a single party if a bank
has extended loans to a nominee company, the Commissioner
may require it to identify the beneficial owner of that
company. This is to determine whether the bank is over-
exposed to the owner's creditworthiness. Should the bank
fail to do so, the Commissioner may require full provisions
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against these loans. It was hoped that this would prevent
a bank from over-exposing itself to party (parties)
connected with its directors or shareholders which dis-
guise themselves through nominee companies.
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CHAPTER VIII
IS THE PROBLEM SOLVED?
Whether the new banking legislation will be effective
in preventing future crises remains to be seen. After
reviewing the causes and the course of the development of
the crisis, the writer felt that the legislation only aimed
at strengthening the quantitative aspect of the control
mechanism. Control on the qualitative side appeared to be
window-dressing:
1. Impracticality of the legislation
It could be argued that there were already provisions
in the revised Ordinance to control those who are to be the
owners and directors of banks. In reality, it is hardly an
effective measure to prevent any Tom, Dick or Harry from
controlling millions of dollars of other people's money."55
With the ownership and management of some existing family
banks unchanged, the Banking Commissioner would find it
difficult to reject an application.
2. Quality of Inspection
Some bankers felt that legislation is one thing and
the capability of the authorities to diagnose a problem is
another. 56 They said that the new legislation gives the
Banking Commissioner extensive powers, but even in the past
he has had enough powers to do so. They stressed that it is
more important to continue upgrading the quality of the
Banking Commission office rather than changing legislation.
Another writer reported that the Banking Commission's staff
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tend to regard themselves as respectable professionals
rather than as policemen in search of financial criminals.57
As the recent crisis was mainly caused by fraudulent acts,
it is doubtful if the same kind of behaviour could detect
symtoms early enough in the future.
At the dawn of the crisis of one of the collapsed
banks, several bankers revealed in a meeting their knowledge
of how that dying bank had been conducting its business.58
These bankers had always been able to sense the presence of
a sick or insane competitor in their midst. Why could not
the examiner? Anyhow, this revealed an important source of
intelligence the Commissioner could not neglect. It was
because of the participants' knowledge of the other people
concerned that the London Stock Exchange and the famous
Lloyd's underwriters were able to function well. Those
concerned broadly knew each other and knew whom to trust
and for how much. This kind of market intelligence has
traditionally formed the basis of the Bank of England's
supervision of the British banking system. With the vast
increase in the number of people and institutions involved,
it may now be required that this method be supplemented by
more formal information requirements. The Deputy Governor
of the Bank of England declared that they still regard
knowledge of the people concerned as the most important
supervisory tool. 59 In a geographically small city like
Hong Kong, where the number of small local banks is small
and decreasing, this kind of informal supervisory tool
would be found most suitable. But it appears that the
Government bureaucracy would have to be modified to make
feasible. The trouble hunter may have to be present at
this
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a lot of business and social gatherings of bankers and
securities brokers and must be prepared to collect gossip
of whatever nature.
3. Abandon the interest rate cartel
The interest rate agreement has been in existence
since the legislation revision after the banking crisis of
1964/65. The formation of the statutory body Hong Kong
Association of Banks made it a legal requirement for all
banks in Hong Kong to offer interest rates no higher than
the HKAB rates. This has come under fire for a long time,
but especially after the currency crisis when the local
currency was "linked" with the greenback. Farrant felt that
this caused the less highly-regarded banks to be unable to
offer higher interest rates in order to attract funds from
the public.60 These banks therefore had to borrow from other
banks even at higher rates As the inter-bank money market
as a source of funds is said to be the least stable form of
finance available to banks, Farrant therefore concluded
that the interest rate cartel has probably hurt the smaller
banks rather than protecting them., This argument was supported
by most economists and bankers but was opposed by those who
are controlling large portion of local deposits and by
Government officials. The abolition of the interest rate cartel
would therefore make the small local banks less dependent
on the interbank market and would make the banking structure
more stable.
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4. Greater Disclosure and Abandonment of Inner Reserves
The other important change recommended by Farrant
was the case for-greater disclosure.61 He said that the
availability of full information to bank users would enable
them to discriminate sensibly. A discriminating customer
base would help to maintain a healthy banking system. John
Clutterbuck of Price, Waterhouse questioned whether it was
appropriate for auditors to say a set of accounts gives a
true and fair view when one bank might have inner reserves
of millions of dollars and another nothing at all."62
Mr. William Purves, Chairman of the Hong Kong Bank,
felt that there was a great deal of merit in the system of
inner reserves for financial institutions because it enabled
out of the difficult years and very good years.some smoothing
Mr. Alexander Au, director and deputy general manager of the
Hang Seng Bank said that scrapping the system could easily
destabilise the economic situation of the territory, and,
therefore, it was the last thing Hong Kong needed in its
run-up to 1997.64 His opinion was that, for a bank which wa:
making a loss, disclosing such unadjusted figures might
deprive it of a chance of recovery when depositors reacted
irrationally to such results. This argument might be correct
But the writer felt that its effect in enabling a mismanage(
bank to keep on attracting deposits from small savers could
not be ignored. Furthermore, what made wide fluctuations in
the profit figures of a bank were mostly the riskly items
which a prudent bank should hesitate to enter into. These
terns included over-exposure to an individual or an industry.
If a bank decided to take such risks in order to make highe
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profits, it should not be protected from seeing the retreat
of its depositors.
Farrant suggested that the present moment is a good
opportunity to move towards greater disclosure. He said:
the public are growing used to the fact that banks have
problems. They no longer expect an automatic increase in
profits year after year. They no longer believe all banks
have massive inner reserves hidden away.65 Mr. David
Nendick, Secretary for Monetary Affairs finally admitted
that they (inner reserves) should not be used for purposes
other than to avoid the sort of random shocks in the per-
formance of banks that arise merely from the fact that
sometimes a risk turns into a bad loss, nor should they be
used to conceal the overall progress of the bank.66 As a
result, the Banking Commissioner was conducting a study
aiming at ensuring that the use of inner reserves did not
mislead the general public and the shareholders. Confidence
in the banking system would improve if depositors and
creditors all knew that-the financial statements revealed
the true financial picture of the bank concerned.
5. The Need for Deposit Insurance
Another recommendation which the Government had no
intention to concede was the need for a deposit insurance
scheme. Academics from both universities felt that in the
long run such a scheme would benefit the banking industry.67
This question was however complicated by the fact that there
were both very big and very small local banks and that local
deposits were concentrated in a few major banks, which would
argue that, given their sound position, the deposit insurance
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scheme would be an unnecessary burden and that they would
be subsidising the smaller banks by contributing the
majority of the premium. It was also true that in the recent
bank collapses, it was not the small depositors who brought
a bank to its knees but the large depositors and the stoppage
of interbank credit line. Nevertheless, with deposit insurance,
Government regulators could afford more options in a bank
crisis because they knew the small depositors were being
taken care of. Mrs. Linda Tsao Yang, the California State's
Saving and Loan Commissioner from early 1980 to the end of
1982, also agreed that. in the presence of a deposit insurance
system, the supervisory authority could afford to have more
options in the situation where a bank faces an insolvency
problem. She said: The whole rationale of deposit insurance
is to protect the small depositors having no access or
knowledge to form an informed judgement as to the health of
a bank.-'By doing so, it helps stabilise the public confidence
and avoid a crisis atmosphere..... Since the average depositors
are being protected, the supervisor would have the option
to close down a bank.68 She however agreed that if the bank
in difficulty was of such a significant size that its collapse
would cause a chain reaction in the financial market, the
Government still had to step in, just as in the case of
Continental Illinois Bank of the USA.
Another version of depositors's protection was
introduced by David K.P.Li who suggested that the clearing
house of the Hong Kong Association of Banks should be run
by the association itself, instead of the present arrangement
whereby it is run by the Hong Kong Bank. By doing so,
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Mr. Li said, the earnings from the use of funds in the
clearing system could be used to establish a fund that would
be available to reimburse depositors in any future bank
failures. 69
6. The Need for a Central Bank
A final point concerning the inadequacy of the new
legislation was the failure of the Government to recognise
the need for a body performing the full functions normally
associated with a central bank. The person who propounded
this theory most enthusiastically was again Mr. David K.P.Li
He said the privileges that the Hong Kong Bank enjoyed for
performing certain central banking functions were unfair to
other banks in the territory and that there was a conflict
of interest when such functions were performed by a private,
profit-making bank. 70 He therefore felt that the fragmen-
tation of central banking functions among different public
and private institutions could impair the capability of
forestalling and coping with a banking crisis.71
All these points should be studied by those who
are interested in the banking industry. They carry both
merits and demerits. With the collective wisdom of so many
people, professionals and academics, a full answer acceptable
to all is yet to be found. Perhaps there will be none. If an
answer cannot be found, the most important thing is to
ensure that we have learnt something from the crisis.
43
CHAPTER IX
LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THE CRISIS
The revised Banking Ordinance was without doubt an
improvement towards better and tighter control. But in
reality people can get. round even the tightest rules. Today
the banking industry is a fast changing one with new
banking services and operating techniques being introduced.
While legislators and banking supervisors have done their
best to design a most up-to-date banking law, they have to
remember the following lessons from the recent local
experience:
1. A dynamic attitude is always required
The U.K. experience demonstrated the inadequacy of
prudential regulation and supervision of parts of the money
market. In the secondary banking crisis it could be seen
that some organisations which had been insignificant in
the past were playing active and important roles in the
money market. The Bank of England reported to the Research
Panel of the Wilson Committee that the strictness of the
control on banks provided the opportunity for the secondary
been outside the scope of the control. 72
banks which had
This kind of development and loopholes in any banking
legislation whereby there were new financial institutions
or techniques to spring up will continue to be there. It
was already certain that some changes in the local banking
practices were underway. Banks engaged in more non-bank
businesses and therefore exposed themselves to new risks.
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Mr. Bill Brown former Area Manager, Asia, of S tandard Chartered
Bank gave the following warning to local bankers:
The banks are doing more and more non-banking
business, and they are doing more and more capital
market business which is off-balance-sheet business
with contigent risk.
How one assesses those risks and has adequate
capital to cope with what could happen in those
markets I think is the big issue.
Banks keep coming out with a lot of these
marvellous new products involving underwriting
facilities. The issue is that there has not been a
major failure in that type of paper.
But at some time there will be, and at that
time, a lot of people will be realising the real
risks that are involved. (73)
He suggested that those involved in securities trading
should look at recent developments in the London market to
get an idea about what could happen in Hong Kong. He said:
Only recently, the FRN (Floating-rate Note)
market in London came to a complete halt. To say the
least, it created something of a flurry in the
dovecote. (74)
Supervising banking operations has thus become a
very sophisticated task. Bank examiners should not only
use the traditional analytical skills but also pay attention
to other macro and even international issues.
2. A New Attitude towards Bank Supervision
There was evidence that some of the fraudulent
activities done by institutions, both locally and in the UK,
could have been checked by the authorities before the out-
break of the crisis. As Moran put it:
The failures of supervision revealed by the
secondary banking crisis did not, therefore, arisere
chiefly from the confused state of the law,
they mainly due to failures of co-ordination. They
arose from the excessive trust place by the
authorities in the independent capacity of bankers to
do business prudently "(75)
45Commenting on the same issue, Clark also said:
"The Bank (of England) had ample powers under
existing (1948 1967) legislation to.intervene in so
far as it thought necessary and desirable. The problem
was that it thought it undesirable to question another
banker's word and, this being so, was prevented from
evaluating whether it was necessary to do so........
However, what was less obvious was that the views of
supervisors needed to become much more critical, to
the point of hostility if need be." (76)
On the local front, the problem was similar in the
sense that the Government had not supervised adequately a
certain segment of the banking sector. Prof. Y.C. Jao
pointed out in a recent article that because of the territory's
being a financial centre for overseas Chinese, much more
attention should be given to the changing business organi-
sations, practices and leadership of the Chinese Diaspora
all over the world.77 He also said that the traditional
family-owned businesses in Hong Kong urgently require
modernization and reform.
3. One-sided Growth of the Economy
A common feature of the crises under review in
Hong Kong and the U.K. was the lack of investment by the
industrial sector compared with the marked attraction of
property development as a hedge against inflation and as a
vehicle for large capital gains. It was widely believed,
prior to the crises, that property values could only go up.
Statistic revealed that banks in Hong Kong lent too much of
their assets to the property sector. In response to the
plea of industrialists to set up an industrial bank, local
Government officials always replied that banks in general
were most willing to lend to all kinds of borrowers and
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that industrialists should find no problem to raise funds
in the money market. This may be true in depressions when
nobody wants to borrow. However, in times of heated
economic activities, the market interest rate may. only be
acceptable to land developers who usually find it no problem
to gain abnormal profits and to absorb any level of interest
rate. Manufacturers who are selling in the competitive
overseas market would therefore find that the market interest
rate was beyond their affordable level. Experience demons-
trated that at times of high economic growth and heated
economic activities, banks were lending a higher portion
of their assets to property-related industries. The writer
is of the opinion that the establishment of an industrial
bank would not only help stabilize the economy but also the
banking sector.
4. Endogenous Instability of the Banking Sector
Those who have a little knowledge of banking
practices are well aware that the era of asset management
has gone. Banks in virtually all parts of the world are
practicing liability management techniques by buying
from the wholesale money market the amount of funds required
to meet the needs of their customers. This led Professor
Hyman Minsky to formulate his theory of financial instability.
He prostulated that the greater the need of units to manage
their liabilities, the greater the susceptibility of the
system to financial failures.78 He therefore concluded that
it is the lender of last resort's (Hong Kong Government's?)
responsibility to prevent the position-making difficulties
of some institutions to lead to a generalised fall in asset
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values and to facilitate a recovery from a recession by
aiding and abetting the restructuring of debts so that the
element of speculative and Ponzi finance in the system is
decreased. Following this theory, the case for a central
bank in Hong Kong is stronger. The fragmented structure of
central bank functions in Hong Kong is obviously unable to
do this. There have been two banking crises in Hong Kong in
the past two decades one in 1964-65 and the other in 1982-
86. In between there have been wild stock market speculation
and gyrations one after another, suppressed bank runs and
DTC failures, wild fluctuations in the property market and
the breath-taking currency crisis of 1983. As a world
financial centre, Hong Kong was also affected by world
economic phenomena like the oil crisis, the slump of the
shipping industry or even price changes in the world
commodity markets. A sound banking system under the protection
and guidance of a central bank might ensure a smooth run-up
to 1997.
S. Choice of Economic Growth versus Financial Stability
Given the fact that fractional banking systems are
suspectible to bank failures, one may ask whether traditional
bank operations should be overhauled to minimize or
eliminate the risk. It will be generally accepted that
measures should be taken to fend off large-scale bank
collapses in the future but not to the extent of hampering
economic growth. Professor Y.C. Jao expressed the opinion
that a much more meaningful and complete criterion for
evaluating the performance of a financial system is not
whether it is immune from crisis or panic of any kind, but
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whether it can in the long-run, mobilize and allocate the
savings of the community to sustain a vigorous growth of
the economy. 79 Sir Michael Sandberg, addressing the Hong
Kong Society of Accountants in 1983, also said that the risk
of aborting growth was just as serious as that of making
bad loans.80 He said:
But what would have happened in Hong Kong had
banks refused to become involved in the risk of
encouraging new textile industries, new electronic
industries, the development of enterprises such as
the Cross Harbour Tunnel.
We have not become the world's third largest
financial centre in our own right by a policy of
diffidence.
While we strive to apply sound banking and
accounting principles and to bring more subtlety and
sensitivity to the decision-making process, we must
not lose sight of the splendid economic promise of
our region....and of our pivotal role in its continued
growth.
No one will argue with Sandberg. But the lesson to
be learned by the authorities after the two crises in Hong
Kong and the U.K. was that high earnings might be an
indicator of potential trouble from imprudent lending and
that capital resources should be enough to cover the infra-
structure of a bank plus some provision against loss on
business risks, so that depositors' money should not be
tied up for these purposes.81 When a bank's profits look
too good, special supervisory attention should be given.
6. International View to Bank Supervision
Peculiar to the local crisis only was the tact tnat
most of the rescued banks have significant debts incurred
outside of Hong Kong. The lesson from this was that Hong
Kong, as an open economy, should be seen as an integrated
part of the Southeast Asian financial system and must be
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expected to import some of its problems. In the early 1980's
the slump in world commodity and oil prices that hit the
Southeast Asian economy has badly affected the property and
stock markets in Singapore and Malaysia, Banks which have
significant exposure have thus imported some of the problems
from outside. The collapse of Ka Wah was particularly obvious.
The trouble of Pan-Electric Industries in Singapore in
November 1983 with outstanding debts of S$400 million was a
disaster to the bank. It was estimated that Tan Koon Swan,
Pan-Electric's head, was the source of substantial guarantees
underwriting Ka Wah's extensive Singapore and Malaysian
portfolios.82 The possibility of further crises to indivi-
dual banks due to foreign economic slumps cannot be ruled
out. While the memory of the collapse of*the property
market was still fresh, the all-too-similar collapse in
the bulk tanker market has also caused some banks to exper-
ience liquidity difficulties. While banks still bear their
in the micro sense, the supervisory body should
own risks
ensure that such large scale misfortune would not be trans-
mitted to more sectors of the economy. While it is not
recommended to hinder the internationalisation or diversi-
fication of banks' portfolios the Banking Commissioner
and his audit staff should pay attention to foreign
economic influences.
Hong Kong has survived, though with pains, two
large scale banking crises in the past two decades. It is
hoped that the memory of them will. always be kept by those
concerned to prevent history from repeating itself for the




List of Court Cases Demonstrating
Fraudulent Practices of Bank Managers and Directors
Durin Hone Kong Banking Crisis, 1982-86
Source of InformationDetails of Court CasesName of bank
Big Cheque Kiting Sdiarp-A. Conspiracy of John Mao Kai-yan with several1. Hang Lung Bank
Revealed. SCMP, Oct.12,85businessmen including directors and manager
of Hang Lung Bank by operating a cheque-
kiting scheme involving a total sum of
US$21.7 billion between 1977 and 1982 which
ultimately led to the collapse, of Hand Lung
Bank. Mao was sentenced to three years' jail.
Dollar Credit BossB. In a related case, Eddy Ko Kin-wah, director
convicted of fraud,and general manager of Dollar Credit and
SCMP, March 7, 1986Financing Ltd., was convicted of charges of
conspiring to defraud and false accounting.
Ko was sentenced to six years imprisonment.
C. Lee Hoi-kwong, director and tai Yu-tsang, Wah Kiu Yat Po, Aug.5,1986
senior manager of Hang Lung were convicted
of charges of conspiring to defraud of
US$124 million belonging to the bank.
2. Overseas Trust Bank A. Patrick Chang Chen-tsorig, director of OTB Chang admits massive
admitted conspiring to defraud OTB of OTB fraud, SCMP,
millions of dollars. He was sentenced to threE July 12, 1986 and
years' jail on July 14,1986 July 14, 1986
Sing Tao Wan Pao,
B. T.C.Huang, former chairman of OTB and Simon
May 3,1986Yip, chairman of the defunct Dominican
Dec.12,1986Finance were arrested in USA by FBI in
connection with the OTB failure. Yip was
charged of 54 counts of conspiracy and false
accounting and was to appear in court again
in Feb. 1937 for extradiction back to H.K.
Appendix I (continued)
OTB official admits
C. Dominic Cheung Kai-man, former manager of conspiracy,
OTB's Macau branch pleaded guilty in a SCMP, Dec.16,1986
charge of conspiracy which exposed the bank
to a risk loss of more than HK$140 million.
He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.
Former DTC boss YipD. Chung Chiu-fat, former director of OTB was
is remanded"
charged on 4 counts with Patrick Chang SCMP, May 9,1986
Simon Yip in court on May 8, 1986
Business leader in
A. Lawrence Chu Cho-ham, president of the Chinese
3. Wing On Bank
alleged $60m loan
Manufacturers Association, was charged in c
conspiracy,
court on January 2, 1987 on conspiracy with SCMP, Jan.3,1987
the late Albert Kwok Chi-bong, former director
arid chief manager of the bank 'on 13 counts
involving HK$60 million.
Kwok to explain bank role,
B. Five members of the Kwok family, including SCMP, March 5, 1987
the chairman of Wing On Bank, are to give
statements under caution to the Commercial
Crime Bureau in the next few days, explaining
their roles in variuous transactions involving
the Wing On Bank......... The Attorney-General
will consider their statements next week and
is expected to decide by next Friday whether
any prosecution should be launched
Bank's fraud losses
A Former chairman Oen Yin Choy was arrested in4. Union Bank
San Francisco and subsequently charged on six total $658m,SCMP, March 12,1987
counts of alleged false accounting and one
count of alleged false statements involving
about IIK$218 million.
Other charges may folloi
B.The Commercial Crime Bureau is considering Oen's arrest",
charges against a number of people in connec-
SCMP, March 11,1987
tion with alleged false accounting at Union
Bank of Hong Kong between 1979 and 1981.
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ArrLNUTA 11
Main Sources of Loss/Bad Debt
Source of Information
Mai gn„rces of Loss/Bad Debt
Name of Bank
SCMP,Sep.,29,1983Loans of $544 million to Worldwide Properties which1. Hank Lung Bank
owns 27.5% of the bank's parent company
2. Overseas Trust Bank A. Conspiracy by Patrick Chang etc. of $200 M
SCMP, July 12, 1986B. Cheque-kiting by Simon 'Yip which cost the
bank US$67million.
SCMP, Dec.,28,1986C. OTB sued Singaporean business Datuk Tan Kim Chuo
formerly chairman of the bank, for repayment of
a HK$122 million loan
SCMP, Sept.,17, 19853. Hong Kong Industrial .Loans of an unspecified amount were lent to borrowers
and Commercial Bank who are believed to be associated with some former
shareholders and directors of OTB with OTB shares
pledged as security.
4. Ka Wah Bank Loaned HK$1.5 billion in Singapore and Malaysia SCMP, Oct.23,1986
including HK$350 million to companies associated
with Malaysian tycoon and politician Tan Koon Swan
5. Wing On Bank Almost HK$275 iiillion of bad and doubtful. debts SCMP, Jan.4,1987
can be tied to the late Albert Kwok, chairman/
6. Union Bank Fictitious loan made between 1975-84 may cost the SCMP, March 12, 1987
bank HK$658 million, of which HK$218 million were
alleged to be connected. with Oen Yin Choy.
7. Hong Nin Bank Loans of HK$160 million to companies and indivi- SCMP, Dec.16,1986
duals linked with the Fung Ping--fun group.
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APPENDIX III
Southeast Asian Links of the batlKS in ILUUUlc
Source of InformatirSoutheast Asian LinkNarae of Bank:
Ripples through the
Malaysian businessman Chang Ming Thief has Deen
1.Hang Lung Bank Maze,a major shareholder for some time. After Chang Far Eastern Economic
death in early 1932, his family members sold the
Review, Oct.13, 1983
stake. When the bank collapsed in Sept.1983,
Philippino ethnic Chinese Chen Eng-kuan was the and SCMP, Dec.28,1986
Managing Director. Chairman was Datuk Tan Kim Chua
who was later sued by OTB for a HK$122 million
loan.
Chang admits massive
Chang Ming--thien -was the chairman until his death2. Overseas Trust OTB fraud,
in 1982, His son Patrick Chang was the managing
Bank SCMP, July 12, 1986
director when the crisis surfaced.




Owned by the Malaysia-based Low tamily since 1975.4. Ka Wah Bank February 1986, pg 8
until CITIC took over.
Local5. Wing On Bank
The Banker
Founded by Chinese businessmen from Indonesia6. Union Banl February 1986, pg 8
in 1964.Indonesian Chinese Oen Yin-choy was the
chairman when the problems occurred.
Local7. Hong Nin Bank
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